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MARKET POWER IN THE BEEF PACKING INDUSTRY:
IS IT TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH?
Lynn Hunnicutt

ABSTRACT

Consolidations in the U.S. beef packing industry have prompted concern within the
government and interest among academics over whether packers possess and are able to exercise
market power. Economists have generated numerous studies to test for and measure market power
in beef packing, but the empirical studies have failed to provide definitive results on the presence
of market power and whether any existing market power is exercised. The thesis of this paper is that
the standard approach to measuring market power, conj ectural variations, is based on a model which
may not accurately describe competition between packing firms. I first discuss the institutional
factors of beef packing that are not captured by the conjectural variations approach. I then present
a theoretical extension of the CV approach which is based on a more realistic description of
competition between packing firms. The paper concludes by suggesting alternative techniques for
measuring market power.

MARKET POWER IN THE BEEF PACKING INDUSTRY:
IS IT TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH?*
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Introduction

Consolidations in the U.S. beef packing industry have prompted concern within the governn1ent and interest among academics over whether packers possess and are able to exercise
market power. Economists have generated numerous studies to test for and measure market
power in beef packing, but the empirical studies have failed to provide definitive results on the
presence of market power and whether any existing market power is exercised. Most studies
(Schroeter (1987), Bhuyan and Lopez (1997), Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993), Schroeter
and Azzam (1990)) conclude that some market power may exist either in the primary input
market or in the consumer market, but that the degree of market power is small. It therefore relTIains somewhat of a puzzle whether packers do indeed possess the market power that
consolidation suggests they might, and if they do how they are exercising it.!
It is reasonable to expect that the numerous studies that appear in the literature
,vould by now have resolved the issue of market power in beef packing, or at least compiled
consistent evidence for or against its existence. On the contrary, as we will show below,
neither compelling nor consistent evidence has emerged, although numerous studies have been
performed. In this paper, we explore possible explanations for these inconsistent results, and
sketch a model that could be used to test one of these explanations. Our purpose here is
not to definitively test a given model of competition, but to suggest alternative explanations
that we hope will lead to theoretical modeling and empirical testing in future studies of the
beef packing industry (and in studies of market power in general).
A review of the empirical literature on market power, specifically in beef packing
and more generally in agricultural markets reveals that most studies utilize the conjectural
variations (CV) approach. 2 CV models, while empirically convenient, are reduced form
models of competition in the beef packing industry. That is, they do not describe the
competitive process leading to a given quantity/price pair. Instead, they posit a particular
competitive process, and attempt to infer the presence of market power using industry quantity /price data. Because the competitive process is assumed, reduced form models do not
require strategic variables, timing of actions, and the information .!3tructure faced by firms to
be fully specified (Fudenberg and Tirole (1987), hereafter F&T). We-contend that the focus
on market outcomes has overlooked important elements of the competitive process in the
beef packing industry. For example, CV models assume that firms are not forward looking,
even when it is known to all parties that decisions made in the current period have important
consequences for future market conditions. Clearly, a test of market power based on an
inaccurate description of competition cannot (except by accident) lead to accurate measures
of market power. 3
A second explanation of the inconclusive results of studies done so far involves the
data used in many of these studies. Models of market power (in any industry) describe
individual firm behavior. Unfortunately, much of the data available is aggregated to the
industry level. Attempting to infer firm behavior using industry data is like trying to judge an
individual student's ability based on the class average test score. Second, the ability of market
*1 thank Dee Von Bailey for helpful conversations regarding this work. this research w~s. supported ~y the Utah
Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State .~niversi~, ~o.gan, Uta~ 8432~-481.0. AddItIonal [mancral support
from the Research Institute on Livestock Pncmg at VrrgIDla Techmcal InstItute IS gratefully acknowledged.
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power studies to generate robust inferences relies heavily on accurately estimated market
conditions - consumer demand, cattle supplies and in-plant processing costs. Inasmuch as
market conditions are inaccurately estimated , tests of firm behavior which rely on them will
also be inaccurate. Finally, data is often incomplete, forcing the use of various proxies for
unobserved prices and quantities. The combined effects of empirical misspecifications and
data constraints may reduce the statistical power of all tests of market power. The CV
approach is particularly vulnerable to these problems, as it requires a large amount of very
detailed data. This weakness of the CV approach may reduce the power of its tests to the
point where it is incapable of generating the inferences that are being sought.4
Given these problems, we find it surprising that alternative tests of market power
have been rarely used in studies of beef packing. Instead, most new studies rely on some
version of the CV model. This might be explained by noting that many constituencies
(researchers, industry groups, policy makers) are likely not content with the results of studies
done so far , so that additional work is desired. Since CV is a well-known approach to market
power, and is based on a widely accepted model of competition, researchers are less willing
to develop new approaches. This complacency, even in the face of known weaknesses is
easily understood, as alternative measures may be difficult to develop, will have to overcome
the natural skepticism of those in the profession, and are sure to have weaknesses of their
own. Even so , we believe that problems with the CV approach call for attempts to develop
alternative measures of market power.
The following section provides further details of the CV model. Section 3 discusses
institutional details of beef packing that suggest a reduced-form approach to market power
such as the CV model may not fit the industry very well, and explain why results from the
CV model are inconclusive. Section 4 sketches a model that includes one of these institutional
details, the fact that packers are forward-looking in their decisions. Section 5 concludes and
presents alternative views of market power.

2

The Conjectural Variations Approach

Conjectural variations (CV) models assume that firms base output decisions on the response
they expect to get from competitors. Limited response of market outcome to changes an
individual firm makes suggests that the market is competitive, while an extensive change in
market outcomes suggests the industry under scrutiny is monopolistic/monopsonistic. Because the estimates of competitor response are based within a solid theoretical framework ,
conclusions derived from the model enable direct predictions of firm behavior. Tests using
the CV fran1ework explicitly permit the decision process of a single firm to be affected by
the behavior of rival firms. The CV model does not require that the conjectures be specified
ex ante, but instead allows empirical data to provide information about the nature of the
conjectures. These reasons , along with relative ease of estimation (provided that detailed
data is available) make conjectural variations a popular choice for measuring and estimating
mar ket power.
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A typical empirical study of beef packing using the CV framework assesses the retailfarm price spread - the difference between prices charged to customers and prices paid to
producers - to measure market power held by processors. Such studies usually involve constructing an economic model of the oligopolyI oligopsony market structure and generating
testable hypotheses regarding the size of the retail-farm price spread. 5 We reproduce t he CV
model as it appears in Schroeter (1987), a seminal article in the field. For brevity, the details
of the model structure are not repeated. The reader is referred to the original publication.
Suppose j = 1, ... , N firms purchase live cattle and produce a single output, boxed
beef. Let Qj denote both the quantity of the raw input and quantity of the processed output
for firm j. (Input and output units have been chosen to simplify the notation.) The market
level quantity of the raw input and processed output is Q. The problenl for the lh firm is to
maximize the current period profit, pQj - WMQj - C(Qj,w), where p is the price of boxed
beef, W M is the price of live cattle (the Material input), and W is the vector of input prices for
factors such as labor and machinery used inside the beef packing plant. The cost function ,
C( Qj ,w), gives the cost of transforming live cattle into saleable output (boxed beef).

ej

Let j = (8Q I 8Qj) (Qj I Q) denote the conjectural elasticity for firm j.
is the lh
firm's perceived rate of change of market output (raw input) with respect to the firm's own
output (raw input) choice, expressed as an elasticity. The range of the conjectural elasticity is
between zero and one. As ej tends to zero, the interpretation is that firms ignore the impact
of their input and output decisions on rival behavior. This is consistent with a competitive
market. As ej tends to one the firm conjectures that its output is synonymous with market
output, so that the firm behaves as a monopolist in the boxed beef market and a monopsonist
in the live-cattle input market.

e

The CV framework can easily be extended to permit distinct conjectures in the raw
input and the output market (Schroeter (1987)). Let e~ denote the jth firm's conjectural
elasticity in the raw input (beef) market and let ej denote the lh firm's conjectural elasticity
in the output (final goods) market. A first order necessary condition for profit maximizing
behavior emerges from the CV model;

p(l +

ejl7]) =

wM(l + e~/E) + CQ(Qj , w)

where 7] and E are respectively the retail market demand elasticity and the live cattle
market supply elasticity, and CQ (Qj, w) is the marginal in-plant processing cost. The first
order conditions encompass a wide range of input-output quantities because of the flexibility
in conjectures. If e~ and ej are both equal to one, equation 1 coincides with a monopolist's
profit maximizing necessary condition and Qj is the monopoly output quantity. If e~ = ej =
o equation 1 collapses to the standard first order condition in a competitive market, and Qj
equals the individual firm's share of competitive market quantity. The empirical approach
is to obtain values of 7] and E estimate and test whether e~ and ej are, in fact , statistically
distinguishable from zero.
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Institutional Details

As noted above, reduced form tests such as the CV model take the competitive process as
given and use observed price/quantity pairs to measure industry competitiveness. Inasmuch
as the competitive process differs from what is assumed, measures of market power will not
be accurate.
For example, packers may be more -interested in assuring a steady supply of
live cattle than in manipulating the price paid for those cattle. In this case, the implicit
assumptions of the CV approach may not coincide with the strategic setting under which
competition actually takes place. In this section, we discuss institutional details that make
competition among beef packers different from what the CV model assumes. The details fall
into six categories , as listed below.

3.1

Cost Structure of Packing Plants

Market power is measured as the ability of a firm to raise the price of its output above the
cost to produce t hat output , or t o reduce the price it pays for its inputs below the value of
t hose inputs to the firm. Thus , measuring market power involves looking for discrepancies
between price and marginal cost (on the output side) or between input price and marginal
revenue product (on the input side). Differences between input price and marginal revenue
product are then attributed to power that packing plants have over feedlots and/or ranchers.
There is an alternative explanation for differences between input price and marginal
revenue product , however. As noted by Morrison (1998b) if average cost is falling, large
packing plants will have lower processing costs than smaller plants. These lower costs raise
the marginal revenue product of each pen of cattle purchased, and thus the plant's profit.
If all packing plants were the same size, this additional profit would be competed away in
a higher price for live cattle. All packing plants are not the same size, however, and the
smallest competitor in a market receives the smallest profit per unit of cattle purchased (zero,
in theory) . Although larger packers would be willing to pay a higher price for the cattle they
purchase , they should attempt to procure needed supplies at the lower price that smaller
competit ors must pay to stay in business. In short , it is the cost structure of beef packing
combined with size differences between packing plants , not market power, that drives a wedge
between input price and marginal revenue product.
This theory has been tested in a series of papers studying both the U.S. and Australian meat packing industries Morrison (1998b) , Morrison (1998a), which find that scale
economies (falling average cost curves) can explain most of the markup of price over marginal cost (output market power) , and of the reduction in input price below marginal revenue
product (input market power). Ignoring this institutional detail may cause researchers to
wrongly attribute to oligopsonistic behavior reductions in input prices below the value of
such inputs.
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3.2

Strategic Variables Other than Price

Beef packers may consider variables other than price in attempts to behave non-competitively.
The concern here is that the CV model assumes the wrong strategic choice variable for packing
firms. Schroeter and Azzan1 (1991) point out that packing plant size has been steadily
increasing since the 1980s, which may lead to " ... a breakdown in the industry's oligopolistic
discipline. " (page 997) This discipline may break down, they say, as plant managers become
more interested in ensuring a steady supply of inputs to keep plants operating at optimal
capacity. As plants expand, the need to operate at efficient scale may outweigh any benefits
obtained from exploiting the market 's oligopsony structure. This fact is noted by Purcell
(1999) who mentions that packing plants may attempt to "smooth" throughput through the
use of captive supplies. Azzam and Park (1993) also suggest that throughput may explain
why the beef packing industry appears to be competitive (based on input price measures)
even as the market share held by the largest four firms has more than doubled.

3.3

Increasing Use of Captive Supplies

One way that packers may influence the prices they pay for inputs is through captive supplies.
Captive supplies lnay involve contracts between packers and feedlots for delivery of a given
number of cattle at a particular date or business arrangements in which a steady supply of
cattle is transferred from feedlot to packer. Alternatively, packers can "capture" supply
by taking ownership of cattle before they enter the feedlot , and paying the feedlot a given
an10unt for finishing. 6 These contracts remove cattle from the spot market , and therefore
might have an effect on spot market prices. As noted in Schroeder, Mintert , and Barkley
(1993), rather than attempting to manipulate the prices they pay, packers may use captive
supplies to guarantee a steady supply of input, particularly during months in which smaller
numbers of cattle are available.
Schroeder et al. (1993) find that the use of contracts reduces the price in spot
markets, although the effect is small. Hayenga and O'Brien (1992) find that the use of
contracts reduces spot market prices in some states (Texas), increases it in others (Kansas),
and has no effect in a third set (Colorado, Kansas , Nebraska). Ward , Koontz , and Schroeder
(1998) also find an inverse relationship between use of forward contracts between packers and
feedlots and spot market prices , although the relationship is somewhat weak and does not
exist for all types of contracts. It appears , then, that captive supplies do not always affect
spot market prices and even when they do , the effect is generally small. This suggests that
packers use captive supplies to smooth their input use , rather than to reduce the prices they
pay. Even so , ignoring t he use of captive supplies may cause market power tests based on
input prices only (as in the CV model) to be inaccurate.
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3.4

Data Aggregation Problems

As noted in the introduction, the data requirements of the CV model are quite extensive. CV
methodology relies on accurate estimates of the output demand and input supply functions
in the market. If either of these estimated functions is incorrect, conclusions regarding firm
conjectures may also be incorrect.
The data typically available are aggregated retail market prices, prices of retail beef
substitutes or other retail demand shifters, farm-gate prices, aggregate market quantity and
prices of factors that are used in the in-plant processing of live cattle. Many empirical studies
rely on a subset of these prices or a proxy of the prices of in-plant factor inputs. Because
data is difficult to come by, and generally aggregated in form, estimates of the demand
and supply functions could be easily misspecified. Jones, Purcell, Driscoll, and Peterson
(1996) provide a model which demonstrates that tests based on aggregate data almost never
correctly infer market power. They demonstrate this result by estimating a model of market
power using data simulated by a generating process from known market structure and firm
behavior. Using data which comes from known behavior, they show that standard CV
estimates perform very poorly. There is no reason to expect that these same estimates will
perform well when data comes from unknown behavior.

3.5

The Dynamic Nature of Competition in Beef Packing

The assumption that firms are concerned solely with current period prices and quantities may
overly simplify the competitive process in beef packing. This problem is familiar to many
authors using the CV approach. Indeed , a large literature exists regarding the "consistency"
of conjectures. 7 Basically, the problem is in defining what firms believe about the actions of
other firms , especially at price-quantity pairs away from the equilibrium solution. Makowski
(1987) points out that the standard interpretation of "conjectures" as describing firm j's
optimal reaction (change in quantity, for example) to a change made by firm i is inaccurate.
While conjectures do accurately describe j's optimal response to i's action at equilibrium,
they do not describe j's optimal response to a change in i's action. The problem is that
"conjectures, which are supposed to reflect one firm 's beliefs about other firms ' strategic
responses to its actions, need a temporal story to be legitimate." (Makowski (1987), pg. 47).
In standard CV models, no such "temporal story" is provided. Lindh (1992) considers the
possibility that firms may behave in non-optimizing fashion in order to "test" rival firms, and
discusses how this might affect equilibrium outcomes.
One way around the problem of dynamics is to ignore them , and claim that the
analysis is static, looking only at a series of equilibria without describing how such equilibria
are reached. This solution is noted in Holt (1985), "A common way of analyzing multiperiod
oligopoly models without dynamic interactions in the payoff structure is to compute a Nash
equilibriun1 for each period taken separately. " (pg. 314) Schroeter and Azzam (1990)
implicitly employ this strategy in using a CV model to test for market power in beef and pork
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production. They do note that " ... we have approximated an inherently dynamic problem with
a static model... " (page 1374). The model we sketch below also uses this strategy, although
we extend the simple assumptions of the standard CV model to incorporate forward-looking
consider ations. 8
Multi-period considerations have important implications for model building, and for
inferences that are drawn from empirical work. For example, the standard CV model implicitly assumes that supply conditions are not affected by packer decisions. This assumption
directly contradicts the cattle cycle literature, where changes in current period demand affect
not only current period choices, but future period conditions as well. As noted in Rosen ,
Murphy, and Scheinkman (1994), competition in the beef packing sector involves a forwardlooking decision process. The dynamics arise from unavoidable technological constraints on
live cattle supplies. A nine-month gestation period, plus a one- to two-year growth lag is
required to produce an animal for slaughter. Consequently, ranchers and feeders face an unavoidable lag from the time they receive a price signal to increase production until increased
supply is actually realized. A supply response lag means that an increase in current period
live cattle demand necessarily affects supply conditions , and WM, for two to three production
periods into the future. In short , packers playa multi-stage game, with decisions at one
stage having ramifications for future stages.
In addition to the biological lag that causes decisions to occur over several periods,
there may be other implications of ignoring or misrepresenting multi-period competition in
beef packing. Given that ranchers/feeders cannot easily relocate their operations and that
beef packing plants are fixed in geographic space, each side should recognize that they will
engage in future dealings. If either side has the ability to punish the other in future dealings,
maximizing current period payoffs may not be in a party's best interest. Additionally, since
there are relatively few large beef packers in the industry each of them can reasonably expect
to be competing with the same firms year in and year out. That is, it is reasonable to assume
that packers engage in a repeated game, with each other and with cattle suppliers, rather
than the one-shot competition posited in the CV model.
If competition in beef packing is repeated, it makes sense to take observations of
some economic variable over time as a measure of market power. Most models using this approach look at price 11l0Vements over time as a measure of collusive behavior. 9 This approach
moves us away from the one-period nature of CV models, and allows for a more realistic
characterization of the competitive setting.

The foundations for this work are the papers of Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu,
P earce, and Stacchetti (1986) , who demonstrate that firms may be able to collude by basing
their actions on the observed market price in the previous period. Firm strategies involve
jointly selling the collusive (monopoly) quantity if the previous period's prices were high
enough. When prices fall below some trigger value, it is presumed that someone cheated on
the collusive agreement. Firms then choose the Cournot level of output (which punishes the
cheater by reducing its profits). After some period of punishment, the game re-enters the
cooperative phase with industry output falling to the monopoly level and firm profits rising.
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These theories of repeated ' competition between oligopolists has been used to model
price changes over the business cycle by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Bagwell and Staiger
(1997), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and Staiger and Wolak (1992) among others. The
basic idea is that firms are better able to collude during one part of the business cycle than
during the other. This means that collusive prices will rise (fall) as the gains from cheating
on the agreement fall (rise) with the business cycle. Empirical support for pro-cyclical prices
is provided in Machin and Reenen (1993) , who study a panel of 709 large UK firms.
Theories of oligopsony collusion in input prices in beefpacking have been tested by
Koontz et al. (1993) , Azzam and Park (1993), and Weliwita and Azzam (1996). The results
of these studies are mixed - Koontz et al. (1993) find evidence of oligposonistic price setting
practices, Azzam and Park (1993) generate mixed results, finding collusive practices from
1955 through 1977, but a reversion to competitive input pricing from 1978 to 1987, while
Weliwita and Azzam (1996) find no oligopsony collusion. The mixed results are somewhat
difficult to reconcile, as these studies cover approximately the same periods. They may be
due to different observational units (Weliwita and Azzam (1996) uses quarterly national data,
Azzam and Park (1993) have annual national observations, and Koontz et al. (1993) have
monthly regional observations), or to different model specifications.
Thus , while repeated interaction between packing firms and the possibility of punishn1ent strategies has been considered , no clear consensus regarding the ability of packers
to exercise rnonopsony power emerges. As far as we know , no tests of multi-period competition (forward looking considerations caused by stock dynamics) have yet been done. In the
following section, we sketch a model that might be used to test this theory. In future work,
we plan to more fully develop and test this model.

4

A Forward-Looking Model of Competition

In this section, we sketch a model of competition in which firms account for the effects of their
current period output/input choices on stock levels in future periods. We demonstrate that
when forward-looking considerations affect firm decisions, market power measures derived in
standard CV models are not accurate.
We take as our starting point the model presented in Kamien, Levhari , and Mirman
(1985). For simplicity we consider two packers (i = 1, 2), each choosing how many cattle xi
to purchase and process in each production period.1 o Without loss of generality, we assume
that live cattle are transformed pound for pound into output (boxed beef). Let X = Xl + x 2
denote the aggregate live cattle purchases and the output that is supplied in the period.
The price of boxed beef is given by the inverse demand function Pb = p(X). Processing
costs that are incurred by each packer in transforming the raw input into output are c( xi).
Live cattle are purchased from ranchers following the supply function Wm = w(X). The
growth characteristics of cattle stocks (s) are represented by the growth function f (s ), so
that St = f(St-I - Xt-I). Following the literature on cattle growth in feedlots , we assume
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1'(S) > 0, and J"(s) < O.
Firm i chooses xi each period to maximize the present value of the sum of per-period
operating profits, 1ft (Pb, wm ) = p(Xt)xi -w(Xt)xi -c( xi), subject to the growth characteristics
of the live cattle stock, and the actions of rival firm j. This value function is
00

V(St)

where (3

L (3t 1ft (Pb,W m )
t=l
S.t . St+l = J(St - Xt) , So , Xo given
=

(2)

= 1/ (1 + r) and r is the market rate of interest.

As is standard in oligopoly models , we assume that firm i believes that its rival's
.
..
.
dx j (xi s)
quantity is given by x J = x J(x'l, s). To ease notation, let rJ == dx i ' denote the rate at which
firm j's quantity adjusts with xi, and let Ri == dX/dx i = 1 +rj denote the rate at which
market output adjusts with Xi . Finally, let c and TJ denote the price elasticity of demand
(-p(X)/Xp'(X)) and the input cost elasticity of supply (w(X)/Xw'(X)) respectively. It
is common to express the rate at which market output adjusts with xi in elasticity form,
ei = ~~; = ~ Ri; thus ei is the conjectural elasticity parameter for firm i.
The output policy will identify each firm's optimal quantity as a function of the cattle
stock, xi = xi(s). Because firm i understands that j's quantity decision is also conditional
on s, firm i's belief about what firm j considers in its choice is x j (xi (s) , s) at the optimum.
The Bellman representation for equation 2 is given by

Firm i is assumed to solve this equation each period.
respect to Xi gives the first-order necessary condition:

[P(X) - w(X)]

Taking the derivative with

+ [P'(X) - w'(X)]Rixi - c'(xi ) - (3V'(J(s - X))f'(s - X)Ri

=

0

(4)

In the standard CV model, firms do not take stock dynamics into consideration, and
maximize only their current period profit. In that case, the firm's objective function is given
by [P(x i + xj(xi)) - w(xi + xj(xi))]xi - c(xi) and the firm's first order necessary condition is
[P(X) - w(X)] + [P'(X) - w'(X)]Rixi - c'(xi ) = O.
The CV model measures market power in the output market as the difference between
price and marginal costs of production, divided by the price. This measure is known as the
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Lerner index, and is given by .c = (p - !VIC)/p. This measure ranges from zero (when the
market is perfectly competitive so that p = !VIC) to one (when the market is a monopoly,
and !VIC is very small in comparison to output price). In the standard CV model, the Lerner
, (X )R ixi

, (X)X

.

(i

index is thus given by .c s = -p p(X ) . This can be decomposed into -~(X) x R'L ~ or £'.
We see , immediately, that unless E is estimated correctly, the standard Lerner index will not
accurat ely measure market power.
i

When stock dynamics are included, we rearrange equation 4 into the Lerner index
as follows:

.c

d

=

p(X) - w(X) - w'(X)Rixi - c'(xi )
p(X)

-p' (X)Rix i + /3V'(·)f'(·)Ri
p(X)

s

~

=.c + p(X)

Measuring monopsony power involves calculating the difference between marginal
revenue product and input cost. The standard measure is M = MRf:-w. Rearranging
the standard first order necessary condition, we see that
w '( X ) Rix~

w( X )

MS =

p(X)+p'(X)Ri x i c'(x i ) w(X)
w(X)
-

When stock dynamics are included, we rearrange equation 4 to obtain
d

M

=

w'(X)Rixi - /3V'(')f'(-)R i
w(X)

S

=

M

~

+ w(X)

Notice that both forward-looking indices include the standard measure plus a correction term. These terms represent the consideration firm i gives to the effect of its current
period choices on the stock available for slaughter in future periods. They will be zero only
under special circumstances. In general, unless firms completely discount future periods
(/3 = 0) , stock levels are unchanging from period to period (f'(-) = 0), or the market is
competitive (Ri = ei = 0) the standard model's estimate of market power will not be accurate. Under perfect competition forward-looking market power measures are equivalent to
the standard measures (both are zero) because firms cannot be assured that they will be the
claimants of the returns from investing in the stock.
This sketch demonstrates that standard measures of market power , such as those
provided by the CV model, which do not incorporate forward-looking considerations may be
biased. It is an empirical matter to determine whether or not such bias exists, and its sign.

5

Conclusions

Consolidations since the 1970s have generated much interest in potential market power in the
beef packing industry. Many studies have attempted to measure market power, but most have
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resulted in findings of no or very limited ability of packers to exploit feeders/ranchers and
consumers. Because these findings are surprising, especially in the face of greatly increased
packer concentration, studies continue to be performed.
We suggest that economists step back from the methods, in particular reduced-form
modeling approaches , currently used to measure market power. We identify six institutional
det ails t h at create problems for the most common method of estimating market power (conjectural variations ). If cost economies exist in beef packing, as Morrison (1998b) suggests,
then marginal revenue product may be greater than input price in more efficient plants.
This divergence is not due to market power, but to the technology underlying beef packing.
Captive supplies may also reduce the price of live cattle on the spot market , although not necessarily the overall (average) price that packing firms pay for cattle. Schroeder et al. (1993),
Hayenga and O'Brien (1992) and Ward et al. (1998) provide some evidence of a negative
relationship between spot market prices and the use of captive supplies. Strategic variables
other than price may be important to packers , as noted by Schroeter and Azzam (1991).
Data aggregation problems may also dramatically affect the reliability of market power measures generated within the CV model, as shown by Jones et al. (1996). Finally, competition
between packing firms is both repeated and forward looking. Tests that exploit the repeated
nature of competition by examining the possibility of oligopsony collusion among packers include Koontz et al. (1993) , Azzam and Park (1993), and Weliwita and Azzam (1996). These
papers generate mixed evidence on collusion between packers. In this paper, we sketch a
model to demonstrate that ignoring forward-looking stock concerns may lead to bias in measures of market power. In future work we intend to test this model to determine whether
such bias exists , and if so whether standard measures over- or underestimate market power.
Possibly the most promising direction for discovering alternative and more powerful
tests of market power in beef packing is the development of extensive form game-theoretic
models. As suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (1987) this approach "forces economists to
clearly specify the strategic variables, their timing, and the information structure faced by
firms." (page 176). For example, a model that analyzes throughput rates with packing
firm payoff functions that capture the value of reduced throughput variability, in a repeated
competition setting, would better characterize key features of the beef packing industry. It
remains for researchers to develop extensive form models that capture other elements of
packer competition, and from these models to generate empirical specifications to test for
market power in beef packing. We hope that this paper helps initiate these efforts.
(Chapter head:) *
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Notes
IThere are several reasons to be concerned about the existence of market power. The most important are
t he economic welfare implications. First , in markets with price-making firms , dead weight losses arise that
reduce total economic welfare . A second effect that may have important political implications, particularly in
agriculture , is wealth redistribution that may result as beef packers exercise control over input prices.

2S tudies of market power in beef packing which do not use the conjectural variations approach include
Koontz et al. (1993) , Azzam and Park (1993 ) and Weliwita and Azzam (1996) . These studies examine the
possibility of collusive pricing among beef packing firms , and find (generally) that no such collusion exists.

3S ee Corts (1999) for a discussion of this problem.

14

4 Jones et al. (1996) present a simulation model that dramatically illustrates these problems. In this paper,
market power predictions of the standard conjectural variations model are almost never accurate.

5See, for example Schroeter (1987).
6See Ward et al. (1998) for a description of the various ways packers contract with feedlots .
7See, for example , Bresnahan (1981) , Makowski (1987) and Lindh (1992).
consistent -conjectures hypothesis is rejected in an experimental setting.

Holt (1985) finds that the

8The literat ure on 'consistent ', ' rational ' and 'reasonable' conjectures suggests that trying to use a static
model to d escribe dynami c competition is doomed to failure. In turn , this suggests that all studies relying on
conjectural variations fundamentally misrepresent the competitive process.
9 Alternatively, one might wish to look at throughput and how it changes over time . As far as we know ,
this approach has not been used to test for collusive behavior in the beef packing industry.

laThe results generalize to competition between more than two packers.
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Abstract
Consolidations in the U.S. beef packing industry have prompted concern within the
government and interest among academics over whether packers possess and are able
to exercise market power. Economists have generated numerous studies to test for and
measure market power in beef packing , but the empirical studies have failed to provide
definitive results on the presence of market power and whether any existing market power
is exercised. The thesis of this paper is that the standard approach to measuring market
power , conjectural variations, is based on a model which may not accurately describe
competition between packing firms. I first discuss the institutional factors of beef packing
that are not captured by the conjectural variations approach. I then present a theoretical
extension of the CV approach which is based on a more realistic description of competition
between packing firms. The paper concludes by suggesting alternative techniques for
measuring market power.
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Introduction

Consolidations in the U.S. beef packing industry have prompted concern within the government and interest among academics over whether packers possess and are able to exercise
market power. Economists have generated numerous studies to test for and measure market
power in beef packing, but the empirical studies have failed to provide definitive results on the
presence of market power and whether any existing market power is exercised. Most studies
(Schroeter (1987) , Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) , Koontz , Garcia, and Hudson (1993) , Schroeter
and Azzam (1990)) conclude that some market power may exist either in the primary input
market or in the consumer market , but that the degree of market power is small. It therefore remains somewhat of a puzzle whether packers do indeed possess the market power that
consolidation suggests they might , and if they do how they are exercising it. 1

It is reasonable to expect that the numerous studies that appear in the literature
would by now have resolved the issue of market power in beef packing, or at least compiled
consistent evidence for or against its existence. On the contrary, as we will show below,
neit her compelling nor consistent evidence has emerged, although numerous studies have been
performed. In t his paper , we explore possible explanations for these inconsistent results , and
sketch a model that could be used to test one of these explanations. Our purpose here is
not to definitively test a given model of competition, but to suggest alternative explanations
that we hope will lead to theoretical modeling and empirical testing in future studies of the
beef packing industry (and in studies of market power in general).
A review of the empirical literature on market power, specifically in beef packing
and more generally in agricultural markets reveals that most studies utilize the conjectural
variations (CV) approach. 2 CV models, while empirically convenient , are reduced form
models of competition in the beef packing industry. That is, they do not describe the
competitive process leading to a given quantity/price pair. Instead, they posit a particular
competitive process , and attempt to infer the presence of market power using industry quantity / price data. Because the competitive process is assumed , reduced form models do not
require strategic variables, timing of actions , and the information structure faced by firms to
be fully specified (Fudenberg and Tirole (1987) , hereafter F&T). We contend that the focus
on m arket outcomes has overlooked important elements of the competitive process in the
b eef packing industry. For example, CV models assume that firms are not forward looking,
even when it is known to all parties that decisions made in the current period have important
consequences for future market conditions. Clearly, a test of market power based on an
inaccurate description of competition cannot (except by accident) lead to accurate measures
of market power.3
A second explanation of the inconclusive results of studies done so far involves the
data used in many of these studies. Models of market power (in any industry) describe
individual firm behavior. Unfortunately, much of the data available is aggregated to the
industry level. Attempting to infer firm behavior using industry data is like trying to judge an
individual student 's ability based on the class average test score. Second, the ability of market
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